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Abstract
The problem of shilling attacks detecting in e-commerce systems is considered. The purpose of such attacks is to artificially 
change the rating of individual goods or services by users in order to increase their sales. A method for detecting shilling attacks 
based on a comparison of weighted temporal rules for the processes of selecting objects with explicit and implicit feedback from 
users is proposed. Implicit dependencies are specified through the purchase of goods and services. Explicit feedback is formed 
through the ratings of these products. The temporal rules are used to describe hidden relationships between the choices of user 
groups at two consecutive time intervals. The method includes the construction of temporal rules for explicit and implicit feedback, 
their comparison, as well as the formation of an ordered subset of temporal rules that capture potential shilling attacks. The method 
imposes restrictions on the input data on sales and ratings, which must be ordered by time or have timestamps. This method can be 
used in combination with other approaches to detecting shilling attacks. Integration of approaches allows to refine and supplement 
the existing attack patterns, taking into account the latest changes in user priorities.
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1. Introduction
E-commerce systems provide the sale of goods and services online on the Internet. Such 
systems offer a wider selection of objects than in ordinary stores, and also reduce the cost of users 
to select and purchase goods of interest to them. In particular, e-commerce systems are widely used 
in the activities of such large companies as Netflix, Amazon, and Google. 
In order to simplify and support the choice of users, recommendation subsystems are used 
in e-commerce systems. The latter form the recommended list of objects for the current user of the 
e-commerce system based on the prediction of his interests, as well as taking into account the pop-
ularity of the offered goods and services. When formed recommendations use data of the selection 
of similar users, as well as information of the similarity of product characteristics [1]. 
In general, e-commerce systems have reactive behavior, as they formulate their proposals 
depending on the user’s reaction. This feature leads to the problem of shilling attacks in such sys-
tems [2]. A shilling attack means that an attacker or a group of attackers artificially change the 
ratings of target goods or services. To do this, fake user profiles created automatically. Fake users 
further modify the ratings of specific products in order to increase (or decrease) their sales. Thus, 
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the goal of a shilling attack is to influence the formation of a personal list of goods and services 
offered to a user. Such a modified list does not meet in the user’s interest [3].
Existing approaches to detecting shilling attacks are based on finding a pattern of behavior of 
attacking users [4]. Such patterns are formed on the basis of an analysis of the data array on the rat-
ings assigned. [5]. To construction attack patterns, statistical methods are used, as well as Supervised 
learning, Unsupervised learning, and a Semi-supervised learning [6]. Supervised learning methods 
allow to detect known attacks, but they are not suitable for combined attacks [7]. To increase the 
efficiency of detecting attacks of various types, a convolutional neural network with deep learning is 
proposed in [8]. However, learning such a network requires significant computational costs, which 
makes it difficult to use it when dynamically changing user interests. Unsupervised learning me- 
thods [9] allow clustering attack patterns in the case of typical behavior of ordinary users. Howev-
er, they do not distinguish between attackers and users with periodically changing interests, who 
occasionally purchase goods and services in e-commerce systems. In order to take into account the 
changing interests of users, a subset of the initial ratings is allocated for a given time interval [10].
The considered methods use rating information and do not use data on purchases of goods 
and services, corresponding to explicit feedback from users of the e-commerce system. Such data 
objectively reflects the interests of the user and is relevant, since it is entered into the database only 
after payment for a product or service.
In general, the considered approaches do not take into account two significant factors that 
allow to quickly detect shilling attacks in the e-commerce system. Firstly, the comparison of the 
results of the explicit and implicit (rating) communications from the user is not performed in order 
to identify the discrepancy between them. Such discrepancy indicates a potential shilling attack. 
Secondly, the temporal aspect of the user selection process is not taken into account. Such a process 
consists of a sequence of decision-making on the purchase or assignment of a rating of goods. The 
hidden relationships between these solutions are described by a set of temporal dependencies [11]. 
The latter reflect typical user behavior patterns. In [12], it is proposed to apply temporal depen-
dencies in the form of a multilayer graph when constructing recommendations online. According 
to [13], temporal restrictions can be used to solve the problem of cold start in a recommendation sys-
tem. However, temporal rules were not used to solve the problem of detecting external influences 
on the e-commerce system. 
Thus, the ability to use temporal rules to identify attacks on the ratings of goods and ser-
vices can be implemented based on the search for discrepancies for selection processes with explicit 
and implicit feedback.
The aim of this research is development of a method for detecting shilling attacks in e-com-
merce systems based on a comparison of temporal dependencies that describe the change in user 
interests for the processes of purchasing goods and forming their ratings.
2. Method for detecting shilling attacks using temporal rules to describe the user’s selection 
sequence
The developed method implements a three-stage scheme for detecting shilling attacks based 
on a comparison of temporal rules. These rules describe implicit time dependencies between the 
user’s choices in the specified processes [14]. At the first two stages, a set of modified rules is con-
structed. Such rules describe the processes of buying and rating. At the third stage, rules differing 
for these two processes are revealed. A discrepancy between concurrently executed rules indicates 
a potential shilling attack.
The method uses a modified type of rules ,m sr  with a temporal operator X (Next) and a quan-
tifier E (Exist). The operator X  links the facts Fm and Fs purchases (rating settings) of the object ij 
for a pair of consecutive time intervals m∆τ  and .s∆τ  The quantifier E defines the ability to pur-
chase an object ij by multiple users uk from multiple users U. The modification is in supplementing 
the rule with a parameter ,s ,mδ  characterizing the change in the user’s interest during the transition 
from the time interval m∆τ  to the interval .s∆τ  The parameter accepts true in case of increase in 
sales (rating). The generalized rule has the following form: 
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                                                  , ,( ) .m s m m s sr F EX F= δ  (1)
The initial data of the method are: sales logL; time stamp Q ratings log; the analyzed object ij; 
a subset of users U, selecting this object; an interval ,s∆τ  that sets the level of detail of time (hour, 
day, week, etc.). 
The method includes the following stages and steps. 
Stage 1. Construction of a subset of weighted temporal rules Rα. The rules describe the de-
pendencies between entries in the sales log.
Step 1. 1. Selection of a subset L1 from sales log entries for the selected object ij and a given 
subset of users U. 
At this stage, records of the sale to users of the object ij (possible target attacks) are selected. 
A subset U includes users who could potentially carry out these attacks. 
The resulting ordered subset L1 has the form:
                                  11 1,1 1, 1 1, 11,
,..., , ,..., : .s s s sLL l l l l s− −= ∀ τ < τ  (2)
Each element l1s of the subset L1 contains information about the buyer uk, object ij, time of 
purchase τs and the number of purchased objects nk,j:
                                     { }1, , ,( , , , ) : 0, .s k j s k j k j kl u i n n u U= τ > ∈  (3)
Step 1. 2. Integration of events l1,s from the set L1 within a given level of time detail ∆τs. At 
this stage, the summation of the number nj,s of purchases of each object ij for all users from the set 
U is performed. 
The result of this stage is a set L2 consisting of elements l2,s: 
                                    2, , , ,( , , ) : .
k s s
s j j s s j s k j
u U
l i n n n
∈ τ ∈∆τ
  
= τ =   ∑  (4)
Each element l2,s of the resulting set contains information about the event «purchase of an 
object ij ∆τs».
Step 1. 3. Temporal rule prototyping. These rules link consecutive pairs of facts mF
α  and 
,sF
α  reflecting consecutive pairs of events l2,m and l2,s. 
The result of this stage is a set R1 of prototypes of unweighted temporal rules. The parameter 
,m s
αδ  is not defined for these rules:
                         { }1 , , ,s 2, 2,, ( ) : .m s m s m m s s s s m mR r r F EX F F l F lα α α α α α α α= = δ ∀ ∃ ∧ ∃  (5)
Step 1. 4. Construction of the set 2R
α  prototypes of weighted temporal rules.
At this step, weights of temporal rules are calculated. The weights ,m sw
α  correspond to changes 
in the number of sales between intervals ∆τm and ∆τs. Normalized weights are calculated as follows:
                                                     , ,,
,
.
max( )
j s j m
m s
j ss
n n
w
n
α
−
=  (6)
The resulting set 2R
α  contains the absolute values of the weights ,m sw
α :
                                                     ( ){ }2 , ,, .m s m sR r wα α α=  (7)
Step 1. 5. Construction of the set Rα  of weighted temporal rules.
At this step, each prototype of the rule ,m sr
α  is supplemented with a parameter value , .m s
αδ  
This value is calculated based on the weight value as follows:
{ }1 , , ,s 2, 2,, ( ) : .α α α α α α α α= = δ ∀ ∃ ∧ ∃m s m s m m s s s m mR r r F EX F F l F l
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,
,
true, if 0,
false, othewise.
m s
m s
wαα  >δ = 
 (8)
The result of this stage is a set of weighted rules that objectively (financially) correspond to 
the needs of users. 
Stage 2. Construction of a subset of estimated weighted temporal rules Rβ, corresponding to 
implicit dependencies between entries in the rating logQ. 
Step 2. 1. Selection of a subset Q1 of rating journal entries, taking into account restrictions 
on the object ij and a subset of users U.
Each element q1s of the resulting ordered set contains a non-negative rating ,k jρ  of a user uk 
for the object ij. This rating does not exceed the maximum value maxρ :
                                { }1, , max ,( , , , ) : 0, .s k j s k j k j kq u i u U= τ ρ ρ > ρ > ∈  (9)
Step 2. 2. Integration of the events q1,s of set Q1 within a given level of time detail s∆τ  by aver-
aging object ij ratings set, by users from a subset U. The resulting set Q2 consists of subsets q2,s with 
an average rating ,j sρ  on the interval ∆τs:
                                    
,
2, , ,
1,
( , , ) : .k s s
k j
u U
s j j s s j s
s
q i
q
∈ τ ∈∆τ
 ρ 
= ρ τ ρ =   
∑
 (10)
Step 2. 3. Construction of prototypes of the temporal rules linking sequential pairs of re-
cords q2,m and q2,s. 
The result of this step is a set { }1 ,m sR rβ β=  of prototypes of unweighted temporal rules, for 
which a parameter ,m s
βδ  is not defined.
Step 2 .4. The construction of set 2R
β  prototypes of weighted temporal rules. Weights ,m sw
β  
characterize the normalized change in rating between intervals ∆τm and ∆τs: 
                                                      , ,,
max
.j s j mm sw
β ρ − ρ
=
ρ
 (11)
The resulting set 2R
β  contains the absolute values of the weights , .m sw
β
Step 2. 5. The construction of set Rβ  weighted temporal rules.
At this step, for each prototype’s rule ,m sr
β  a parameter value ,m s
βδ  is set. This value is calcu-
lated similarly to the value , .m s
αδ
The result of this stage is a set of weighted rules that describe the change in ratings of goods. 
Stage 3. Construction of an ordered subset of temporal rules ,attackedR
β  fixing possible shil-
ling attacks.
Step 3. 1. Definition of a set of values ,m sj  based on pairwise comparison of parameters 
,m s
αδ  and , .m sβδ  Values ,m sj  indicate inconsistencies in user priority changes for rules ,m sr α  and ,m sr β :
                                             , ,,
true, if ,
false, othewise.
m s m s
m s
α β δ ≠ δj = 
 (12)
The result of this step is a subset of the rules 3 ,R
β  that indicate a possible artificial change in 
the ratings in the interval ∆τs:
                                                { }3 , ,: true .m s m sR rβ β= j =  (13)
Step 3. 2. Calculation of inconsistency of standardized rule weights ,m sr
α  and , .m sr
β  Nor-
malized weights ,m sw
α  and ,m sw
β  show the relative degree of change in a parameter charac-
terizing the objective and subjective interest of a group of users in the same object ij. Since 
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, true,m sj =  then the interest of users at the same intervals varies in different directions (for 
example, purchases are growing, but the rating is not increasing or falling). This enables pos-
sible to set priority the anomaly based on the sum ,m sw∆  of the modules of the normalized 
weights of these rules:
                                                  , , ,
.m s m s m sw w w
α β∆ = +  (14)
The value ,m sw∆  for , truem sj =  indicates an atypical change in the rating of the object ij 
between the intervals ∆τm and ∆τs: the higher , ,m sw∆  the higher the probability of a shilling attack.
Step 3. 3. Ordering rules ,m sr
β  according to value , .m sw∆
The resulting set attackedR
β  of rules r(k), indicating a probable shilling attack is:
                       
(1) (2) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( ), ,...., , ,... : .k k k kattackedR r r r r k w w
β − −
= ∀ ∆ < ∆  (15)
The ordered set attackedR
β  obtained as a result of this stage contains the most likely attack 
objects at the top of the list.
The method allows an iterative implementation, in which at the first iteration all users are 
included in the subset. On following iterations, users who do not rate the rules from the set attackedR
β  
are deleted from the subset U. Iterative implementation of the method makes it possible to gradually 
reduce the subset of potential attacking users.
3. Experimental results
The experimental verification of the method was performed on two data sets. The first data 
set was formed from two files: ratings.csv and to_read.csv, which contain ratings and reading notes 
for several million books. This data is ordered in time, but there are no time stamps [15]. The 
purpose of the first experiment was to evaluate the possibility of applying the method to detected 
temporal dependencies in the absence of timestamps. Therefore, the combined events 2,sl  and 2,sq  
were select by allocating a fixed number of records. The results of the method implementation for 
one book object are presented in Table 1.
The results of steps 1 and 2 in Table 1 contain key rule elements. 
For example, the temporal rule from the second line has the form:
                                                  1,2 1 2( true) .r F E X F
α
=  (16)
The parameter 1,2 true,
αδ =  since the number of sales (or book readings) increased from 7 to 11. 
The weight is 1,2w
α  of this rule 0,108. 
Rules 6,7 ,r
β  10,11,r
β  14,15r
β  and 17,18 ,r
β  for which 
, true,m sj =  
fix a possible shilling attack. The attack analysis priority is set based on the difference in weights 
,m sw∆  for these rules. 
Iterative method implementation for a rule 10,11,r
β  with the first priority allowed to increase 
the value 10,11w∆  to 0,385. The number of users – potential attackers at the same time decreased by 
more than 5 times. Therefore, the iterative application of this method allows to highlight the group 
of users who have made the greatest contribution to the distortion of the rating of goods or services 
of the e-commerce system.
The second experiment was performed using the Online Retail dataset from the UCI repos-
itory. This set contains sales data with timestamps and does not contain ratings. Therefore, the set 
was artificially supplemented with 10 ratings for the same object, which did not correspond to the 
dynamics of its sales. The time interval was 1 day. Discrepancies for the rules were obtained only 
for adjacent time intervals (for pairs of consecutive days). This result indicates the need to use other 
types of rules to increase the accuracy of attack detection.
, ,...., , ,... : .>tt
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Table 1
Method implementation results
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
s j,sn m,sw
α
m,s
αδ j,sρ m,swβ m,sβδ m,sj m,sw∆
Attack analysis pri-
ority 
1 7
2 11 0.108 True
3 18 0.189 True
4 17 0.027 False
5 20 0.081 True 5.000
6 15 0.135 False 4.833 0.033 False False
7 21 0.162 True 4.500 0.067 False True 0.229 2
8 30 0.243 True 4.641 0.028 True False
9 17 0.351 False 4.386 0.051 False False
10 22 0.135 True 4.457 0.014 True False
11 35 0.351 True 4.405 0.011 False True 0.362 1
12 26 0.243 False 4.388 0.003 False False
13 37 0.297 True 4.491 0.021 True False
14 31 0.162 False 4.436 0.011 False False
15 31 0.000 False 4.466 0.006 True True 0.006 4
16 26 0.135 False 4.357 0.022 False False
17 28 0.054 True 4.445 0.018 True False
18 25 0.081 False 4.446 0.000 True True 0.081 3
19 13 0.324 False 4.350 0.019 False False
4. The discussion of the results
The result of this research is a method for detecting shilling attacks by means of a compara-
tive analysis of the choice of users of an e-commerce system using temporal rules. Temporal rules 
describe changes in user interests over time, for example, by day, week, etc. At the first stage, the 
method creates temporal rules that describe the growth or decline in sales of the selected product. 
The implicit feedback used at this stage, objectively reflects a change in the interests of users, since 
they have already paid for the purchase of the specified product. At the second stage, the method 
uses explicit feedback to form temporal rules that reflect changes in the rating of the same product. 
At the third stage, the comparison of the obtained rules is performed. Inconsistency of the rules, 
for example, an increase in sales of a product and a drop in its rating at the same time intervals, 
indicates a possible shilling attack. The list of conflicting rules is ordered by the sum of the values 
of their weights, since weights characterize the normalized change in purchases and ratings at the 
same time intervals. With the growing discrepancy between the scales of temporal rules for pur-
chases and ratings, the likelihood of a shilling attack also increases. 
The ordered list of weighted temporal rules obtained as a result of the method characterizes 
the most probable attacks, taking into account the list of potential attackers.
The difference of the proposed method is the use of temporal dependencies to identify dif-
ferences in the processes of purchasing goods and forming their ratings as a necessary condition 
for a shilling attack. 
The advantage of the method is the ability to iteratively clarify the composition of the user 
group that had the greatest impact on the artificial change in product ratings. This change is a sign 
of a shilling attack. 
The disadvantage of this method is that the temporal rules used in detecting attacks specify 
dependencies only between adjacent time intervals. This approach does not allow to search for 
attacks at various levels of granulation time of the process of user selection. 
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The method has a limit on the source data, which should be ordered by time. The presence of 
time stamps is also desirable, which allows to group the source records at the required level of detail. 
The developed method is designed to detect attacks and then interactively refine the list of 
attacking users. The method can be used to quickly refine the results of existing resource-inten-
sive approaches to identify shilling attacks, taking into account recent changes in user priorities. 
Additional scope of application of the method includes predicting the anomalous states of discrete 
processes. An example of such tasks is the calculation of the peaks of Internet traffic information 
system [16]. 
5. Conclusions
The problem of the prompt detection of shilling attacks, consisting in artificially changing 
the ratings of goods and services in the e-commerce system in order to influence their sales, is 
considered. The recommended personal list of objects obtained after such attacks will not meet the 
user’s needs. 
A method is proposed for detecting attacks on the rating of goods and services in e-com-
merce systems based on a comparison of weighted temporal rules that describe the user’s selection 
sequence. The method includes the steps of forming rules describing the temporal dependencies 
between sales of goods and between their ratings, as well as constructing an ordered subset of tem-
poral rules that fix possible shilling attacks.
This method differs from the existing ones by using discrepancies between purchases objec-
tively reflecting user preferences and subjective ratings to identify shilling attacks.
The proposed method allows increasing the efficiency of prompt detection of shilling at-
tacks, taking into account the constant preferences of users in the e-commerce system. 
Further improvement of the method involves the use of rules with the “Future” temporal 
operator. This operator associates the current user selection with a selection at one of the following 
time intervals. The combination of the Next and Future operators will make it possible to compare 
the change in user choice for an arbitrary pair of intervals and thereby ensure the detection of at-
tacks at different levels of time granulation. 
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